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The Financial Reporting Consequences of Proximity to Political Power 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we apply a new concept, corporate proximity to political power, to accounting research and 
examine its consequences on corporate financial reporting. Prior literature shows that higher proximity to 
political power leads to higher policy risk, i.e., uncertainty regarding the impact of future administration 
policies on the cash flow of the firm. An increase in policy risk implies an increase in the opaqueness of the 
information environment and in the expected volatility of future operating profitability; we argue that these 
effects both encourage and facilitate earnings management. Drawing on recent research in finance and 
political science, we use a measure of the alignment along party lines between politicians elected at the state 
level and the federally elected President as our main measure of proximity to political power. We find a 
significant positive association between the political alignment of firms’ home states and their level of 
absolute discretionary accruals. Consistent with the idea that firms engage in corporate political activities 
(lobbying and financial contributions) to hedge against policy risk, our results only hold for firms not 
engaging in such activities. 
 
1. Introduction 
Does political geography, i.e. the dynamic evolution of the political map as it emerges from federal and 
state-level elections, matter for financial reporting? Changes in political geography result in exogenous 
shifts of firms’ proximity to powerful politicians. Kim et al. (2012) and Pantzalis and Park (2014) 
showed that proximity to political power implies greater exposure to uncertainty about the impact of 
future policy initiatives on firms. Such policy risk can translate into higher cost of equity (Kim et al. 
2012) and debt capital (Bradley et al. 2015).1 In this paper, we posit that, in addition to its potential cost 
of capital implications, exposure to policy risk can make firms’ economic environment more volatile 
and less transparent, creating both incentives and opportunities for firms to engage in earnings 
management. 
Our analysis introduces a metric of political geography to accounting research by adopting the 
measure of corporate proximity to political power proposed by Kim et al. (2012) which focuses on the 
political alignment of firms’ home states with the federally elected president. We find that proximity to 
                                                     
1 Kim et al. (2012) provide evidence on the causal relationship between proximity to political power and risk, by regressing 
lagged changes in proximity on changes in systematic risk (ΔBeta). They show that the coefficient of (ΔBeta) is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. Bradley et al. (2015) use the same measure of proximity to political power and find that it is 
negatively related to corporate bond ratings and positively related to firms’ cost of debt. 
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political power is positively and significantly associated with earnings management, measured by the 
absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the Jones (1991) model as modified by Dechow 
et al. (1995).  
To corroborate the robustness of our results, we employ alternative proxies for both our 
dependent and independent variables and provide numerous other robustness analyses. The main results 
remain unchanged when using alternative discretionary accrual models (Jones 1991; Kothari et al. 
2005), taking into account exogenous business shocks (Owens et al. 2016), including a more extensive 
set of control variables and estimating our main regression model in changes. In addition, following the 
approach proposed by Pincus and Rajgopal (2002), we document that the observed earnings 
management efforts are partly driven by smoothing considerations. Based on ideology measures taken 
from Berry et al. (1998), we also calculate two measures of ideological proximity to political power; 
using these metrics, the results are comparable to the ones obtained with our main measure of proximity 
to political power. 
We furthermore investigate the relation between political geography and earnings management 
conditional on more direct types of political connectedness. We test whether firms actively pursuing 
political strategies via lobbying expenditures and contributions to political action committees are 
different from other firms (i.e., those not politically active but merely relying on passive political 
connections) when it comes to implications of proximity to political power. Consistent with the idea that 
actively pursuing corporate political strategies constitutes a hedge against policy risk stemming from 
exogenous variation in political geography (Bradley et al. 2015), we find that earnings management is 
not significantly associated with proximity to political power for firms which engage in political 
strategies but is positively and significantly associated for firms that do not. Taken together, our results 
strongly suggest that political geography has effects on firms’ financial reporting decisions and that 
more proximity to political power leads to more earnings management. We furthermore document that 
different forms of political connectedness have different effects on financial reporting outcomes and 
affect firms’ reporting choices in a substitutive manner.  
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Our results contribute to the literature on the effects of political forces on financial reporting 
(Watts 1977; Watts and Zimmerman 1978). In recent years, a number of studies have investigated the 
effects of corporate political connections on the strictness of accounting enforcement, audit quality and 
earnings quality (Batta et al. 2014; Bliss et al. 2011; Chaney et al. 2011; Correia 2014; Guedhami et al. 
2014; Gul 2006). Similarly to Chaney et al. (2011), we use a discretionary-accruals-based measure of 
earnings management as our dependent variable. Our research goes beyond the existing literature by 
using a political-geography-based metric of corporate proximity to political power as our independent 
variable of interest. This measure, in essence, depicts a firm’s indirect (or “passive”) connectedness that 
arises from its location in the political map, and which captures the degree of potential exposure to 
policy risk (Kim et al. 2012). In contrast to other more direct political connectedness proxies used in the 
accounting literature, ours has the double advantage of being fully exogenous to firms’ own decisions 
and providing us with a large number of observations in the empirical tests. Additionally, it goes beyond 
the dichotomy of classifying firms as either politically connected or non-connected and accounts for 
both exposure to policy risk and indirect connectedness.  
We furthermore contribute to research on the effects of geography on financial reporting. 
Geographic proximity has been found to provide informational advantages (Choi et al. 2012; John et al. 
2011). Shi et al. (2015) find that geographically dispersed firms engage in more real but less accruals-
based earnings management. Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) and DeFond et al. (2011) argue that closeness 
to a regional office of the Securities and Exchange Commission facilitates supervision by the latter and 
therefore leads to less reporting misbehavior and more conservative going concern opinions. While the 
effects of political geography have received attention in the finance literature over recent years (e.g., 
Faccio and Parsley 2009; Kostovetsky 2015; Pantzalis and Park 2014), our study is the first to investigate 
its consequences for financial reporting.  
The remainder of our paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the literature and 
develops our hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the research design. Section 4 describes our data. Section 
5 presents our main empirical results and section 6 gives details on additional analyses. Finally, section 
7 concludes. 
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2. Background and hypothesis development 
2.1. Effects of political connectedness on firms’ information environment 
Over the past 30–40 years more and more firms are choosing to become politically active as a means to 
better compete in a business landscape that has become entangled with the political one. Politically 
connected firms have been found to differ from non-connected firms with respect to financial reporting 
characteristics. Corporate political connections exert an influence on accounting processes via more 
lenient enforcement (Correia 2014), a lesser reliance of connected firms on the capital market due to 
better access to credit financing (Leuz and Oberholzer-Gee 2006; Chaney et al. 2011), protection from 
government expropriation (Batta et al. 2014), effects on statutory audit (Guedhami et al. 2014; Gul 2006) 
and political costs due to higher visibility of connected firms (Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010), 
among others. While the literature on the effects of corporate political connections on financial reporting 
has grown reasonably broad, potentially differential effects of different forms of connections have not 
been investigated so far. In a study of the determinants of government bailouts, Duchin and Sosyura 
(2012) collect data on a broad range of connectedness measures, including geographic as well as 
financial links between firms and politicians. They find correlations between these measures to be low, 
indicating that they capture different aspects of political connectedness. 
Political connections have ambiguous economic consequences for firms. A number of 
connectedness advantages have been identified in the literature, including a higher likelihood of being 
bailed out (Blau et al. 2013; Faccio et al. 2006), better access to bank financing (Claessens et al. 2008; 
Li et al. 2008), a lower effective tax rate (Adhikari et al. 2006; Wu et al. 2012) and a higher chance of 
obtaining government procurement contracts (Goldman et al. 2013; Tahoun 2014). At the same time, 
there is evidence that political connections serve corporate insiders at the detriment of outside investors. 
Tu et al. (2013) find that politically connected acquirers of privatized firms engage in tunneling. Yu and 
Yu (2011) find that firms that lobby evade fraud detection, on average, 117 days longer than other firms. 
Correia (2014) and Fulmer and Knill (2012) find that SEC enforcement tends to be more lenient on 
firms which contribute to political action committees. Firms’ proximity to the political process may 
additionally expose them to higher policy risk (Bechtel and Füss 2010; Mattozzi 2008) or induce them 
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to overinvest in order to electorally support the incumbent government (Bertrand et al. 2006; Wu et al. 
2012). In a systematic review of the literature on global corporate political activity, Rajwani and Liedong 
(2015) conclude that, in developed countries, studies find positive as well as negative effects of political 
connections on firms’ operating and capital market performance. Hillman and Hitt (1999) describe 
corporate political activities as market-like processes where the political quid pro quo consists in 
politicians supplying public policy and firms providing the political exchange goods: money, 
information and votes. 
Political quid pro quos are likely to depend on some level of secrecy and neither firms nor 
politicians trading favors are interested in much scrutiny (Ben-Nasr et al. 2015). At the same time, the 
less strict enforcement of disclosure rules on connected firms facilitates a higher degree of opaqueness. 
Corporate political connections therefore could lead to higher information uncertainty, defined in terms 
of the precision with which firm value can be estimated by knowledgeable investors at reasonable cost 
(Chen et al. 2013; Jiang et al. 2005). Chen et al. (2010) accordingly show that financial analysts forecast 
earnings of connected firms less accurately than earnings of non-connected firms. Aabo et al. (2015) 
find that firms located in areas subject to more local political influence are associated with greater 
comovement with other local stocks and greater levels of excessive preference by local investors (i.e., 
local bias). Both measures are related to informational frictions in stock market (Barberis et al. 2005; 
Ivković and Weisbenner 2005). In the accounting literature, political connections are generally found to 
be positively associated with measures of earnings management (Chaney et al. 2011; Ramanna and 
Roychowdhury 2010). Connected firms have also been found to suppress the release of bad news before 
important political events (Piotroski et al. 2015). They appear to pay higher audit fees than non-
connected firms, indicating that they are perceived more risky by auditors (Bliss et al. 2011; Gul 2006; 
Wahab et al. 2011).  
2.2. Political geography as a source of corporate political connectedness  
The literature on corporate political connections has identified a number of different sources of corporate 
connectedness to politicians including, inter alia, financial contributions to election campaigns and 
lobbying expenditures (Correia 2014), top management’s past service in government or the military (Wu 
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et al. 2012) and equity ownership by influential politicians (Faccio 2006; Tahoun 2014). While most of 
these forms of connectedness result from deliberate corporate actions, firms can also be passively 
connected to politicians by the effects of political geography. Politicians have electoral motivations to 
care about the economic condition of their constituency and therefore have incentives to channel national 
funds to their voting districts (Cohen et al. 2011). Consistent with this explanation, event studies have 
found negative capital-market reactions upon the news of the unexpected death of a politician for firms 
located in his or her home state (Faccio and Parsley 2009; Roberts 1990). Studies on determinants of 
government bailouts during the 2008 financial crisis find that geographic political connections played a 
role in allocation of assistance under the Troubled Asset Relief Program (Duchin and Sosyura 2012; 
Kostovetsky 2015). In addition to channeling financial funds to their home states, politicians may also 
lean on regulatory agencies to provide more lenient treatment to electorally important firms, e.g., those 
employing a large workforce in their electoral district (Heese 2015).  
As is the case with other forms of corporate political connections, indirect connections via 
proximity to political power stemming from political geography have ambiguous effects. While firms 
enjoy the benefits described above, they may at the same time be exposed to higher policy risk. Veto 
player theory (e.g., Tsebelis 2002) argues that a government divided along partisan lines is generally 
less capable of implementing large policy changes. This implies that financial markets can operate under 
less policy risk than in times of unified governments (Bechtel and Füss 2008; Fowler 2006). In a federal 
system such as the United States, a state government which is politically aligned with the federal 
president will be more likely to fully and quickly implement federal policies whereas states politically 
opposed to the president may attempt to veto or delay implementation. Consistent with this interpretation 
of political alignment leading to higher policy risk, Kim et al. (2012) find that political alignment of a 
firm’s home state is significantly associated with higher returns. Pantzalis and Park (2014) show that 
the effect of geographic proximity to centers of political power is particularly strong in the presence of 
substantial corruption or dependence on government spending.  
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2.3. Hypotheses 
The preceding discussion suggests that proximity to political power can have a detrimental effect on 
firms’ information environment. It may increase information uncertainty which facilitates earnings 
management as investors are less able to see through it. At the same time, higher policy risk implies an 
increase in the expected volatility of future reported earnings. This would in turn lead to an increased 
risk of violating accounting-based covenants and to less smooth earnings figures being reported to 
investors. Both effects have been found to motivate earnings management (Dechow and Skinner 2000; 
Graham et al. 2005; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Schipper 1989). We thus conclude that proximity to 
political power may both facilitate and encourage earnings management and state our main hypothesis 
as: 
H1: Firms’ proximity to political power is positively associated with earnings management.  
We note that our argument does not rely on managers consciously taking politics into account 
when making decisions about accruals. Our argumentation only requires that managers become aware 
of the profitability consequences of increased policy risk which previous literature has shown to result 
from proximity to political power.  
We are furthermore interested in the interaction of proximity to political power stemming from 
political geography, a form of indirect political connectedness, and other, direct forms of political 
connectedness emanating from firms actively pursuing corporate political strategies. There is little 
research on how these different political connections are related. Antia et al. (2013) argue that firms use 
political strategies to hedge policy risk and find that they adjust their lobbying expenditures in reaction 
to changes in political geography. Bradley et al. (2015) investigate the relation of proximity to political 
power and the cost of debt. They find no significant association for firms engaging in lobbying and/or 
contributing to PACs; for firms not engaging in such political strategies, they document a significantly 
positive association. Their results are consistent with the interpretation that firms successfully engage 
in corporate political strategies to hedge their exposure to policy risk. Based on these considerations, we 
posit that the effect of proximity to political power may be mitigated for firms lobbying and contributing 
to PACs and state our second hypothesis as: 
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H2: The association between proximity to political power and earnings management is less 
pronounced for firms engaging in corporate political activities.  
3. Research Design 
3.1. Measuring proximity to political power 
In our empirical tests, we focus on one particular setting in which effects of political geography lead to 
changes in firms’ proximity to political power: the political alignment between the federally elected 
President and politicians elected on a state level along party lines. We use the political alignment index 
(PAI) developed by Kim et al. (2012) as our measure of proximity to political power. PAI indicates the 
degree of alignment of state politicians with the President along party lines. PAI is calculated at the 
state-level and defined as follows: 
PAI =
1
4
∙ SENATORS + 
1
4
∙ REPRESENTATIVES +
1
4
∙ GOVERNOR +
1
4
∙ (
1
2
∙ STATE SENATORS +
1
2
∙ STATE REPRESENTATIVES) 
where SENATORS is the percentage of the state’s two senators that belong to the President’s 
party; REPRESENTATIVES is the percentage of House representatives that belong to the President’s 
party; GOVERNOR is a dummy variable that equals one if the Governor is in the same party as the 
President, and zero otherwise; STATE SENATORS is a dummy variable that equals one if the percent 
of state senators in the President’s party is greater than 50%, and zero otherwise; STATE 
REPRESENTATIVES is a dummy variable that equals one if the percentage of House representatives 
in the President’s party belonging to a given state is greater than 50%, and zero otherwise. PAI is a state-
year specific variable; every two years, PAI is updated following presidential and midterm elections.2 
                                                     
2 Gubernatorial elections in a majority of states are held simultaneously with either presidential or midterm elections. Five 
states (Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, New Jersey and Virginia) hold elections off the federal cycle. To ensure that these 
states do not drive our results, we repeated our main analysis excluding firms headquartered in one of these five states and 
obtained qualitatively unchanged results.  
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We furthermore corroborate our results using two measures of ideological proximity to political 
power, which are based on the ideology indexes developed by Berry et al. (1998; 2010). In particular, 
we use Berry et al.’s (1998) revised 1960-2013 citizen ideology series, IDEO_CIT, and their 
ADA/COPE measure of state government ideology, IDEO_GOV. IDEO_CIT (IDEO_GOV) measure 
the average location of the active electorate (of the elected officials) in each state on a liberal-
conservative continuum, with higher values indicating a more liberal orientation. First, to capture the 
ideological proximity between citizens and the federal government, we use IDEO_CIT times a dummy 
variable for fiscal year ends that fall into time periods with a Democratic President. We denote this 
measure as IPFG (ideological proximity to the federal government). Second, similar to Pantzalis and 
Park (2014), we use these measures to calculate an ideology alignment metric on the state level. 
Specifically, we compute the absolute value of the distance between IDEO_CIT and the respective state 
government ideology (IDEO_GOV); we multiply this distance by negative one so that higher values 
represent a greater alignment of ideologies. We denote this measure as IPSG (ideological proximity to 
the state government).3 Both IPFG and IPSG, similarly to PAI, capture the notion that political alignment 
facilitates policy change and hence leads to policy risk. Therefore, we expect that these variables are 
positively associated with earnings management.  
3.2. Measuring earnings management 
We measure earnings management by the absolute value of discretionary accruals (ABSDA), calculated 
using the Jones (1991) model as modified by Dechow et al. (1995). We estimate the following model 
for each industry-(we use the Fama-French 48 industry classification based on Fama and French 1997)-
year group, excluding industry-year groups with less than 20 observations: TA = β1 (
1
ASSETS
) +
β2∆REV + β3PPE + 𝜀. Then we obtain an estimate of normal accruals (NA) as: NA = β1̂ (
1
ASSETS
) +
β2̂(∆REV − ∆AR) + β3̂PPE. Discretionary accruals are calculated as TA minus NA. TA is total 
accruals, calculated as: change in current assets (Compustat ACT) minus change in cash and short-term 
investments (Compustat CHE) minus change in current liabilities (Compustat LCT) plus change in debt 
                                                     
3 We also repeated the analysis using Berry et al.’s (2010) nominate measure of state government ideology. The results are 
qualitatively unchanged. 
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included in current liabilities (Compustat DLC) plus depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat 
DP). ∆REV is change in revenues (Compustat REVT); ∆AR is change in accounts receivables 
(Compustat RECT); PPE is gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat PPEGT). All variables are 
scaled by beginning of year total assets (ASSETS, obtained as Compustat AT). We assume that a higher 
level of ABSDA implies a higher level of earnings management. 
3.3. Relating proximity to political power and earnings management  
We relate earnings management to proximity to political power using the following regression model: 
ABSDA = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1PAI + 𝛽2LNSIZE + 𝛽3BM + 𝛽4LEV + 𝛽5LNOC + 𝜀 
ABSDA is our measure of earnings management and PAI is our measure of proximity to 
political power, calculated at the end of the fiscal year. We choose the control variables following prior 
literature (e.g., Francis et al. 2004, Francis et al. 2008). LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of market value 
of equity, calculated as the number of common shares outstanding (Compustat CSHO) times the stock 
price at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat PRCC_F). BM is the book-to-market ratio, calculated as 
the book value of equity (Compustat CEQ) divided by the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal 
year. LEV is calculated as the ratio between total liabilities (Compustat LT) and total assets (Compustat 
AT). LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle, calculated as the sum of days accounts 
receivable and days inventory.4 Following, for example, Bradley et al. (2015), we include industry-, 
year- and state-fixed effects and present firm-clustered adjusted standard errors. 
4. Dataset and summary statistics 
4.1. Data 
We obtain the data necessary to calculate the earnings management measures and the control variables 
from Compustat Annual and Compustat Quarterly. To measure proximity to political power, we use the 
dataset collected by Kim et al. (2012). We do not include financial firms (SIC 6000–6999). In addition, 
                                                     
4 Days accounts receivable are calculated as 365 multiplied by the ratio of accounts receivable (Compustat RECT) over sales 
(Compustat SALE). Days inventory are calculated as 365 multiplied by the ratio of inventory (Compustat INVT) over cost of 
goods sold (Compustat COGS). 
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we exclude firm-year observations for which PAI is not available in Kim et al.’s (2012) dataset. PAI is 
a state-year specific variable, which is updated every two years after presidential and midterm election 
outcomes; we merge PAI with accounting data, using the available observations at the end of the fiscal 
year. Firms are matched with state-level PAI based on the location of their corporate headquarter.5 Table 
1 describes the sample selection procedure. The final sample for our main analyses consists of 120,123 
firm-year observations for fiscal years from 1966 to 2008, corresponding to 11,038 distinct firms. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile. In additional analyses we use analysts’ 
data from I/B/E/S and data on congressional committees obtained from Charles Stewart’s website. Data 
for our active political strategies variable (POL_ACT), which is based on corporate PAC contributions 
and lobbying activities, is available from the Center for Responsive Politics (CRP). All variables used 
for the measurement of ideological proximity to political power are available from Richard Fording’s 
website.6 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
4.2. Descriptive statistics and cross-correlations 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables used in the empirical analysis. ABSDA, our 
measure of earnings management, has a mean value of 0.1117 and a standard deviation of 0.1729. Our 
measure of proximity to political power, PAI, has a mean equal to 0.4617 and a standard deviation of 
0.2316. Our average sample firm has a market value of equity approximately equal to $ 126.83 Million. 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
                                                     
5 We follow the procedures in Kim et al. (2012) to determine the geographic location at the end of the fiscal year. Headquarter 
address information is initially extracted from Compustat; because Compustat indicates only the latest address information, 
Compact Disclosure is then used to account for address changes. We drop 187,557 observations for which address information 
is unavailable in Compustat or where there are inconsistencies between the information reported in Compustat and that reported 
in Compact Disclosure. Our final sample is larger than the final sample in Kim et al. (2012) because we have different 
requirements concerning the control variables and do not require the availability of monthly stock returns. 
6 See https://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/ 
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Table 3 reports Spearman correlations (above the diagonal) and Pearson correlations (below the 
diagonal) for the main variables. The correlation between ABSDA and PAI is not significantly different 
from zero: the Spearman coefficient is equal to -0.0034 and the Pearson coefficient is equal to 0.0087. 
The different levels of aggregation of ABSDA and PAI (where the former is measured at the firm-year 
level and the latter at the state-year level) are likely to bias the univariate correlations downwards and 
to explain the insignificant coefficients. In the multivariate analyses this problem is alleviated since we 
use state- and year-fixed effects (together with industry-fixed effects and other control variables).  
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
5. Main Empirical results 
5.1. Proximity to political power and earnings management 
Table 4 reports the main results of the model relating earnings management to the political alignment of 
the state where the firm is headquartered. The coefficient on PAI is positive and highly significant; 
hence, firms located in states that are more closely aligned with the President are more likely to engage 
in earnings management. Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in PAI is associated with a 
~2.28% increase in earnings management. In essence, since the magnitude of one standard deviation of 
PAI is 0.2316, the aforementioned economic effect can be approximately triggered by a change in party 
control of just one of the four political components of a state’s PAI (i.e., senators, congressmen, 
governor and state legislature). For example, a shift in control of a state’s governorship in favor of the 
party of the President would, on average, result in a ~2.3% increase in earnings management by firms 
located in that state. The control variables have the expected signs; in particular, size appears to explain 
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a high portion of the variation.7 Overall, these results support H1. Proximity to political power is 
positively associated with the propensity of managers to manage earnings.8  
When separately focusing only on positive and negative discretionary accruals, respectively, the 
results are similar to those obtained from the pooled sample and seem to be stronger, in terms of both a 
higher magnitude of the coefficient and a higher significance level, in the case of negative discretionary 
accruals than in the case of positive discretionary accruals.9 However, testing the differences between 
the coefficient on PAI in the regressions of column (2) and (3) does not yield significant results. Hence, 
the results are not consistent with alternative political-costs-related motivations for earnings 
management that would predict stronger results on downwards (i.e., income-decreasing) earnings 
management relative to upwards (i.e., income-increasing) earnings management.10 
< Insert Table 4 about here > 
Our analysis is based on the argument that political alignment along partisan lines facilitates 
policy change and hence makes the policy environment more volatile. A similar effect may be produced 
by ideological proximity between a state’s citizens and the federal government and between a state’s 
citizens and the state’s government. To test this conjecture, we repeat our tests using IPFG and IPSG, 
which are based on Berry et al.’s (1998) ideology indexes. IPFG measures ideology proximity between 
the state’s citizens and the federal government, whereas IPSG measures ideology proximity between the 
                                                     
7 To further investigate the role of LNSIZE, we also ranked the firm-year observations in quartiles based on LNSIZE and 
replicated the main analysis for each quartile, separately. The coefficient on PAI is positive in all quartiles; it is significant (at 
the 10% level) in the first (bottom) quartile, insignificant in the second quartile and significant (at the 1% level) in the third and 
fourth quartile. Therefore, the significance of the association is higher in the top quartiles than in the bottom quartiles; however, 
the coefficient on PAI in the bottom quartile is not significantly different than the coefficient on PAI in the top quartile. To 
control for LNSIZE after partialling out the effect of corporate political strategies, we also double sorted the observations by 
POL_ACT and then by LNSIZE and find that the results remain qualitatively similar to the quartile-regressions based on 
LNSIZE. 
8 As described in section 3, PAI is updated every two years following presidential and midterm elections. There are five states 
which are off the federal election cycle. In order to ensure that our results are not affected by the inclusion of these five states, 
we ran the same analysis excluding all firm-years in which a firm is headquartered in one of these five states. Our results are 
qualitatively unaffected by this exclusion.  
9 A number of prior studies use a similar research design and examine the determinants of positive and negative discretionary 
accruals, separately. See, e.g., Yu (2008). 
10 Watts and Zimmermann (1978) suggest that political costs are one of the key drivers of accounting choices. Under the 
political-costs hypothesis, firms attempt to defer reporting profits in order to deflect attention away from political decision 
makers and/or the public (Ramanna and Roychowdhury 2010). As proximity to political power increases policy risk, one could 
expect that firms with higher political alignment would use income-decreasing earnings management more extensively as part 
of their overall political strategy. 
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state’s citizens and the state’s government. The results, which are reported in Table 5, show that both 
IPFG and IPSG are positively associated with earnings management. These results are similar to the 
ones we report in Table 4 and they lend support to our interpretation of our main findings: changes in 
the political geography, which imply higher proximity to political power, lead to higher earnings 
management.  
< Insert Table 5 about here > 
5.2. Corporate political strategies  
In this section, we put hypothesis H2 to test by examining a subsample of companies that actively pursue 
corporate political strategies. To identify this subsample, we look at companies that either lobby or make 
contributions to PACs. The idea underlying these analyses is that companies that are politically active 
should have substantially lower incentives to manage earnings, as they are already partially hedged 
against risk stemming from proximity to political power. Thus, we expect the relation between earnings 
management and proximity to political power to be less pronounced for politically active firms than for 
firms that are not politically active. 
The lobbying data we use is available from the CRP from 1998. Lobbying data are more 
comprehensive after the passage of the Lobbying Disclosure Act (LDA) of 1995 that mandates lobbying 
registrants to file semi-annual reports with the Secretary of the Senate and the Clerk of the House of 
Representatives. We only use our PAC data whenever we also have lobbying data available, as otherwise 
we could not be sure whether firms engaged in lobbying activities, even in cases where we know that 
they did not make PAC contributions. Hence, our analyses that are presented in this subsection are 
limited to firm-years between 1998 and 2008. In these analyses, our sample size reduces to 29,646 firm-
year observations belonging to 5,141 distinct companies. We use the dummy variable POL_ACT that 
takes the value one in firm-years where a respective firm either lobbies or makes PAC contributions; it 
takes the value zero if the firm pursues neither of these potential courses of action and if we have 
information on both PAC contributions and lobbying activities. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 
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show that only ~15.98% of the 29,646 firm-years with PAC and lobbying data belong to firms actively 
pursuing political strategies.  
Firms’ decisions to engage in political activities are possibly affected by their home state’s 
political alignment. We follow two distinct strategies to alleviate concerns related to a potential selection 
bias. First, following Bradley et al.’s (2015, p. 21) proceedings, we use a propensity score matching 
(PSM) procedure. For every state-year with enough observations for estimation, we estimate a probit 
regression of LNSIZE, BM and INDPOLACT (defined as the proportion of firms, in the same industry 
and fiscal year, which are politically active) on POL_ACT and match firms based on the propensity 
scores that result from this regression on a one-to-one basis. This procedure yields 4,413 firms that did 
as well as 4,413 firms that did not engage in political activities.11 Using PSM to alleviate potential self-
selection concerns comes with the advantage of having the same amount of observations available in 
both the treatment (POL_ACT = 1) and the control group (POL_ACT = 0); thus, PSM allows us to select 
two subsamples which are not only comparable in terms of the characteristics of the political activity 
choice but also not driven by the different sample sizes of firms engaging and not engaging in political 
activities. We report the PSM results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 6.  
Second, we also apply a two-stage Heckman (1979) model to counter potential criticism related 
to self-selection in our analyses of firms (not) engaging in political actions. We use the same selection 
equation that we also use for our PSM and report the results of the second-stage regression in columns 
(3) and (4) of Table 6.12 
< Insert Table 6 about here > 
Both using the Heckman model as well as PSM, we find that the relation between proximity to 
political power and earnings management is only significant for firms that are not politically active 
                                                     
11 We note that the PSM procedure, which matches firms on a one-to-one basis by state and fiscal year, leads to the loss of 
some observations for which data on political activity are available. The Heckman model, which we use as an alternative 
approach, uses all the observations for which data on political activity are available. 
12 The coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio is omitted from columns (3) and (4). It is equal to 0.148 (t-value 4.52) for politically 
active firms and it is equal to -0.028 (t-value -1.80) for politically inactive firms.  
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(POL_ACT = 0). The coefficient on PAI is highly significant in columns (2) and (4) but insignificant in 
columns (1) and (3). Overall, the analysis in Table 6 confirms H2 by showing that the association 
between proximity to political power and earnings management is not statistically significant if firms 
actively pursue political strategies.  
6. Additional analyses 
In this section we present additional analyses and robustness checks to the main results presented in the 
preceding section.  
6.1. Alternative specification of the main model 
We consider an alternative specification of our main regression model in which we add further control 
variables. To further control for the effect of financial weaknesses on reporting incentives, we also repeat 
the analysis for profit firms and loss firms, separately. The results of the main (alternative) specification 
are reported in the first two (last three) columns of Table 7. 
In the alternative specification, additionally to LNSIZE, BM, LEV and LNOC, we include 12 
further control variables. Following Francis et al. (2008), we add the following six control variables: the 
standard deviation of cash flow from operations (obtained as net income before extraordinary items, 
Compustat IB, minus total accruals, as defined in section 3), scaled by prior year total assets (Compustat 
AT), from year (𝑡– 3) to year 𝑡; the standard deviation of sales (Compustat SALE), scaled by prior year 
total assets (Compustat AT), from year (𝑡– 3) to year 𝑡; the frequency of negative earnings, measured as 
net income before extraordinary items (Compustat IB), from year (𝑡– 3) to year 𝑡; capital intensity, 
measured as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment (Compustat PPENT) divided by total assets 
(Compustat AT); intangible intensity, measured as the sum of reported R&D expense (Compustat XRD) 
and advertising expense (Compustat XAD) divided by sales (Compustat SALE), with R&D and 
advertising expenses being set to zero if absent; a dummy variable for absence of intangibles. 
Furthermore, we add: the Altman’s Z score13 to control for financial weaknesses of the firm; the total 
                                                     
13 The Altman’s Z-score is obtained as: Z = 1.2 × WC/AT + 1.4 × RE/AT + 3.3 × NIBE + 0.6 × MVE/TL + REV/AT; where 
WC is working capital (Compustat WCAP); RE is retained earnings (Compustat RE); NIBE is net income before extraordinary 
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tax expense (Compustat TXT), scaled by prior year total assets (Compustat AT), to control for taxation 
effects on reporting incentives; Tobin’s Q14 to control for investment opportunities; cash flow from 
operations, to further control for real activities; a dummy variable for financial statements audited by 
Big 5 audit firms, calculated using data on the audit firm (Compustat AU) to control for the quality of 
auditing. Finally, we also add the antitakeover index developed by Bebchuk and Cohen (2003)15 to 
further control for corporate governance effects on earnings management choices. The antitakeover 
index measures the antitakeover protections offered to firms by a state. It is defined so that it increases 
with the level of protection. The index is calculated at state-year level and we merge the data with our 
dataset using the index corresponding to the end of the fiscal year.  
The results show that with all models and in all subsamples, inferences regarding the association 
between PAI and earnings management are unchanged. We note that that there is a significant loss of 
observations with the alternative specification; this is due to the availability of data on some of the 
additional control variables. 
< Insert Table 7 about here > 
To further control for regulatory differences across industries, we repeat the analysis by 
excluding 11 industries which are highly regulated (the industries are selected based on the Fama and 
French classification): Agriculture; Tobacco Products; Healthcare; Pharmaceutical Products; Defense; 
Precious Metals; Non-Metallic and Industrial Metal Mining; Coal; Petroleum and Natural Gas; Utilities; 
and Communication. The results, which are untabulated, are unchanged relative to the main analysis 
(we ran the regression with 100,948 observations; the coefficient of PAI is equal to 0.013; the t-value is 
equal to 4.71). 
                                                     
items (Compustat IB); MVE is the market value of equity (Compustat PRCC_F multiplied by Compustat CSHO); TL is total 
liabilities (Compustat LT); REV is revenues (Compustat REVT) and AT is total assets (Compustat AT). 
14 Tobin’s Q is calculated as: TQ = (MVE+BVL)/(BVE+BVL); where MVE is market value of equity (Compustat CSHO times 
Compustat PRCC_F); BVL is book value of liabilities (Compustat LT); BVE is book value of equity (Compustat CEQ). 
15 The data are obtained from Lucian Bebchuk’s webpage at the following URL: 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/data.shtml. 
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6.2. Corroborating the earnings management metric  
To alleviate the concern that our results are driven by a particular specification of our discretionary 
accruals model, we replicate the main analysis using two alternative discretionary accrual models. First, 
we use the original Jones (1991) model;16 second, similar to Kothari et al. (2005), we include ROA in 
the Dechow et al. (1995) model.17 The results are untabulated. With both models, inferences regarding 
the association between PAI and ABSDA are unchanged. Using the original Jones (1991) model, the 
coefficient on PAI is positive (0.0123) and significant with a t-value of 4.80. For the Dechow et al. 
(1995) model with ROA included, the PAI coefficient takes the value of 0.009 and is significantly 
different from zero with a t-value of 3.61. 
Furthermore, abnormal accruals models have been subject to frequent criticism in the literature 
(e.g., Dechow et al. 2010, Owens et al. 2016). One of the main points of criticism is that abnormal 
accruals are also affected by business shocks, and therefore may sometimes provide only a rough proxy 
of managerial discretion used in reporting accruals. In order to mitigate the concern on the inability of 
abnormal accrual models to distinguish the discretionary component of accruals from the effect of 
business shocks, we repeat the analysis by excluding firm-year observations which are likely to be 
associated with business shocks. Following Owens et al. (2016), we exclude the obvervations with: (1) 
major acquisitions (Compustat SALE_FN = “AB”); (2) large discontinued operations (discontinued 
operations greater than five percent of sales, i.e., Compustat DO divided by Compustat SALE > 0.05); 
(3) four-digit SIC industry changes; (4) large restructuring charges (restructuring charges greater than 
five percent of sales, i.e., Compustat RCP divided by Compustat SALE > 0.05); (5) large special items 
(special items greater than five percent of sales, i.e., Compustat SPI divided by Compustat SALE > 
                                                     
16 Following Jones (1991), we estimate the following model for each industry (we use the Fama-French 48 industry 
classification)-year group, excluding industry-year groups with less than 20 observations: TA = β1 (
1
ASSETS
) + β2∆REV +
β3PPE + 𝜀. TA is total accruals, calculated using the balance sheet method (see section 3); ∆REV is change in revenues 
(Compustat REVT); PPE is gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat PPEGT). All variables are scaled by beginning of 
year total assets (ASSETS, obtained as Compustat AT). Discretionary accruals are obtained as the estimated residuals. 
17 Following, e.g., Kothari et al. (2005), we control for performance in the expected accrual model. We estimate the following 
model for each industry (we use the Fama-French 48 industry classification)-year group, excluding industry-year groups with 
less than 20 observations: TA = β1 (
1
ASSETS
) + β2∆REV + β3PPE + β4ROA + 𝜀. Then we obtain an estimate of normal 
accruals (NA) as: NA = β1̂ (
1
ASSETS
) + β2̂(∆REV − ∆AR) + β3̂PPE + β4̂ROA. Discretionary accruals are calculated as 
TA – NA. TA is total accruals, calculated as using the balance sheet method (see section 3); ∆REV is change in revenues 
(Compustat REVT); PPE is gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat PPEGT); ROA is obtained as net income before 
extraordinary items scaled by end of year total assets (Compustat AT). All variables, except ROA (which is calculated using 
year-end total assets, are scaled by beginning of year total assets (ASSETS, obtained as Compustat AT). 
19 
 
0.05). Excluding those observations leads to the loss of 12.23% of the sample; despite the reduction in 
the number of observations, the results, which are untabulated, are qualitatively similar to the main 
analysis (the coefficient on PAI is equal to 0.009, the corresponding t-value is 3.57). This suggests that 
our findings are not driven by business shocks which are unrelated to discretionary reporting choices 
and lends further credibility to our main results. 
6.3. Proximity to political power and earnings management aimed at smoothing 
One of the underlying objectives of the earnings-management effects that we document might be 
managers’ desire to report smooth earnings (e.g., Ronen and Yaari 2008). Trueman and Titman (1988) 
argue that uncertainty about firms’ underlying operations gives rise to incentives for opportunistic 
income smoothing. To investigate whether proximity to political power is associated with earnings 
management aimed at smoothing we use the ‘smoothing with discretionary accruals ratio’ (SMR) 
proposed by Pincus and Rajgopal (2002).18 We also consider a broader measure of earnings smoothing, 
which reflects both the discretionary and non-discretionary smoothing portion, which we denote as 
SMQ.19 However, the focus of this robustness analysis is on SMR, because SMQ reflects both the non-
discretionary and the discretionary portion of smoothing, while SMR only focuses on the discretionary 
part. We repeat our main analysis, now using SMQ and SMR as dependent variables, respectively. The 
results are reported in Table 8. For SMR, consistent with the results described above, the coefficient on 
PAI is positive and significantly different from zero; for SMQ, the coefficient on PAI is not significantly 
                                                     
18 Pincus and Rajgopal (2002) empirically test and find oil and gas firms to use abnormal accruals and hedging with derivatives 
as substitutes to manage earnings volatility (see also Barton 2001). SMR is defined as follows: SMR = 𝜎(NIBACQ)/
𝜎(NIBEQ), where σ refers to the standard deviation calculated over the fiscal year. NIBEQ is net income before extraordinary 
items (Compustat IBQ) scaled by prior quarter total assets (Compustat ATQ). NIBACQ stands for quarterly net income before 
extraordinary items and discretionary accruals, which is obtained as quarterly cash flow from operations plus quarterly non-
discretionary accruals. Quarterly cash flow from operations is obtained as quarterly net income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat IBQ) minus quarterly total accruals. Quarterly total accruals is calculated as: change in quarterly current assets 
(Compustat ACTQ) minus change in quarterly cash and short-term investments (Compustat CHEQ) minus change in quarterly 
current liabilities (Compustat LCTQ) plus change in quarterly debt included in current liabilities (Compustat DLCQ) plus 
quarterly depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat DPQ). All variables are scaled by beginning of quarter total assets 
(ASSETSQ, Compustat ATQ). Consistent with the analysis on annual level, to estimate the quarterly discretionary portion of 
accruals we use the Dechow et al. (1995) model. Specifically, we estimate the following model for each industry (we use the 
Fama-French 48 industry classification)-year-quarter group, excluding industry-year-quarter groups with less than 20 
observations: TAQ = β1 (
1
ASSETSQ
) + β2∆REVQ + β3PPEQ + 𝜀. Then we obtain an estimate of normal accruals (NAQ) as: 
NAQ = β1̂ (
1
ASSETSQ
) + β2̂(∆REVQ − ∆ARQ) + β3̂PPEQ. Quarterly discretionary accruals are calculated as TAQ minus 
NAQ. ∆REVQ is change in revenues (Compustat REVTQ); ∆ARQ is change in accounts receivables (Compustat RECTQ); 
PPEQ is gross property, plant and equipment (Compustat PPEGTQ). All variables are scaled by beginning of quarter total 
assets (ASSETSQ). A higher value SMR indicates greater use of discretionary accruals aimed at smoothing reported earnings. 
19 SMQ is defined as follows: SMQ = 𝜎(CFOQ)/𝜎(NIBEQ); where CFOQ is quarterly cash flow from operations. A higher 
value of SMQ indicates smoother earnings. 
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different from zero. These results lend support to the view that, as policy risk increases with proximity 
to political power, managers use discretionary accruals choices to smooth earnings. These findings shed 
more light on the association between earnings management and proximity to political power and 
suggest that it is partly driven by smoothing-motivated earnings management. 
< Insert Table 8 about here > 
6.4. Committee chairmanships 
Observers of the federal policy-making process in the United States emphasize the role of Congressional 
committees and the importance of their chairmen’s agenda-setting powers (e.g., Roberts 1990; Shepsle 
1989). This agenda-setting power gives chairmen an important influence over the outcome of the 
legislative process (Shepsle and Weingast 1981; Walker 1977). Cohen et al. (2011) find that chairmen 
of important committees earmark public spending for their home states, crowding out private 
investment. A change in chairmanship of an influential committee involving a politician from a given 
state may therefore have implications for firms from that state which are difficult to predict.  
We obtain data on the composition of Congressional committees from Charles Stewart’s 
website20 and follow Stewart (2012) in identifying the ten most influential committees.21 We consider 
all chairmen and ranking minority members with considerable influence in House and Senate 
committees.22 In our committee analyses, we proceed as follows: At the end of each month and for each 
state, we identify the number of relevant committee members at the House and at the Senate. For each 
fiscal year and state we build a dummy variable, denoted as CHAIRMEN, which is equal to one if there 
has been a change in the number of influential committee members from the particular state during the 
fiscal year and zero if there has not been any change to this number. Using this variable, we estimate 
                                                     
20 Information on committee members at the House and at the Senate is available at the website 
http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html. From the database we extract the following data regarding committee 
members: name, state, date of appointment and termination, party, role in the committee. 
21 Specifically, for the Senate, the ten most influential committees are: Finance, Veterans Affairs, Appropriations, Rules, Armed 
Services, Foreign Relations, Intelligence, Judiciary, Budget, and Commerce. For the House, these committees are: Ways and 
Means, Appropriations, Energy and Commerce, Rules, International Relations, Armed Services, Intelligence, Judiciary, 
Homeland Security, and Transportation and Infrastructure. Our results are similar if we focus on the five or on the three most 
influential committees or consider all committees. 
22 Our results are robust to changes on the definition of influential committee members. If we exclude all ranking minority 
members, e.g., we obtain very similar results. 
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our main model on the relation between proximity to political power and earnings management for 
observations where CHAIRMEN is equal to one and zero separately. These results are reported in 
columns (1) and (2) of Table 9. In column (3) of Table 9, we also interact CHAIRMEN with the other 
variables in the main model. 
< Insert Table 9 about here > 
The analysis in Table 9 indicates that the effect of PAI on earnings management is significantly 
stronger in states in which there has been a change in the number of holdings of influential 
chairmanships. This result is consistent with the interpretation that changes in influential committee 
chairmanships create additional risk for firms of the respective state which adds to the effect of political 
alignment. 
6.5. Effects of temporal distance to election  
In this section, we examine whether the strength of the association between PAI and earnings 
management varies across time. Uncertainties about future policies are partly resolved by elections, 
which means that the effect of proximity to political power which we conjecture to affect earnings 
management via policy risk may vary over the electoral cycle. We therefore investigate the effect of 
PAI on earnings management during different parts of the electoral cycle. In particular, we investigate 
whether the effects of political alignment on earnings management are different in: election years; 
presidential election years; post-midterm-election years; individual years over the presidential election 
cycle; and short periods around presidential elections. To do this, we build a set of dummy variables 
that take value one when the end of the fiscal year corresponds to the above time periods and zero 
otherwise. For each period analyzed, we then include the dummy variable in our main model and we 
interact it with all the independent variables. We report the results of these tests in Table 10, which also 
presents the coefficients obtained when estimating the main model in the single periods, separately. Our 
analysis shows some evidence that the effect of home state political alignment on firms’ earnings 
management choices becomes stronger in periods preceding presidential elections and abates thereafter. 
The association between earnings management and proximity to political power, as measured by the 
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coefficient on the interaction term between PAI and the dummy for the period considered, tends to be 
stronger in periods before elections; however, the interaction term is significantly different from zero 
only in some of the periods considered. 
< Insert Table 10 about here > 
6.6. Proximity to political power and volatility of future operating profitability 
To bring further support to the view that political alignment is connected to increased (policy) risk we 
tabulate analyses that relate political alignment to the volatility of firms’ future operating profitability 
in Table 11. We measure volatility of future operating profitability by the standard deviation, calculated 
over the next three fiscal years, of cash flow from operations, scaled by prior year total assets. We regress 
PAI, the control variables used in the main model (LNSIZE, BM, LEV and LNOC) as well as further 
control variables similar to Subramanyam (1996)23 on volatility of future operating profitability. The 
coefficient on PAI is positive (0.004) and significantly different from zero (t-value: 2.76). This result 
supports the view that PAI induces policy risk and that higher levels of political alignment imply a 
higher volatility of operating profitability in the future. 
< Insert Table 11 about here > 
6.7. Model in changes 
We estimate our main model (that is presented in column (1) of Table 4) in changes, where both the 
dependent variable and the independent variables are the changes from year 𝑡– 1 to 𝑡. The results are 
untabulated. In this regression, the coefficient on the change in PAI is positive (0.011) and highly 
significant (t-value: 3.32). These findings provide further support for the documented positive 
association between proximity to political power and earnings management. 
                                                     
23 The further control variables that we use are: cash flow from operations, (signed) discretionary accruals and non-discretionary 
accruals (all as defined in section 3.2). 
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6.8. Tests of the informativeness of earnings management  
We investigate the informativeness of earnings management associated with PAI by examining whether 
the predictive ability of discretionary accruals with respect to future operating profitability is related to 
PAI. Specifically, following Subramanyam (1996), we regress future cash flow from operations or net 
income before extraordinary items (in the first, second and third year after the current fiscal year) on 
current discretionary accruals (as well as current non-discretionary accruals and current cash flows from 
operations) and we interact all explanatory variables with PAI. The results are untabulated.24 Similar to 
Subramanyam (1996), we find that the coefficient on discretionary accruals is positive and highly 
significant. However, the coefficient on the interaction term of discretionary accruals and PAI is not 
significantly different from zero in five out of six models; it is significantly (at the 10%) different from 
zero (and negative) only when using cash flow from operations in the following year as the dependent 
variable. The results on these interaction term suggest that earnings management associated with PAI is 
neither more nor less informative than other earnings management choices.  
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we examine whether exogenously determined corporate proximity to political power, as 
reflected in political alignment between politicians of a firm’s home state and politicians on the federal 
level, has an influence on corporate earnings management. Prior research has argued that such political 
alignment increases policy risk by diminishing gridlock which prevents policy change (Kim et al. 2012). 
This creates additional uncertainty in a firm’s information environment, which both encourages and 
facilitates earnings management. We test this argument by investigating the relation between a measure 
of political alignment and the absolute level of firms’ discretionary accruals, our measure of earnings 
management. The analysis covers 120,123 firm-year observations from 11,038 distinct firms from all 
U.S. states over the 1966 to 2008 period.  
                                                     
24 Following Subramanyam (1996), we estimate the following model: OP𝑡+𝑘 = β0 + β1CFO𝑡 + β2NDA𝑡 + β3DA𝑡 + β4PAI𝑡 +
β5CFO𝑡 × PAI𝑡 + β6NDA𝑡 × PAI𝑡 + β7DA𝑡 × PAI𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 where CFO is cash flow from operations, scaled by prior year total 
assets; NDA is non-discretionary accruals; DA is discretionary accruals; OP is a measure of operating profitability (either net 
income before extraordinary items or cash flow from operations), scaled by prior year total assets. We estimated the model for 
k = 1, 2, 3. In all the models β3 is positive and significantly different from zero. β7 is significantly different from zero (it is 
negative and significant and the 10% level) only for k = 1 and OP = CFO.  
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Our results indicate a positive association between proximity to political power and earnings 
management. We furthermore find that this association only holds for firms which do not engage in 
lobbying or make financial contributions to PACs. Prior research has shown that firms use such political 
strategies as a hedge against policy risks (e.g., Kim et al. 2014). In line with these earlier findings, we 
conclude that our results are indeed driven by the higher policy risk in politically aligned states. We 
furthermore document a similar effect using a measure of ideological alignment between a state’s 
citizens and respectively their state’s government and the federal president.  
Our results are related to Chaney et al.’s (2011) findings that firms whose owners or top directors 
are themselves politicians or are tightly related to high-ranking politicians have significantly poorer 
earnings quality. They argue that these firms can afford lower earnings quality since they have privileged 
access to finance and are therefore less subject to capital-market pressures. Such advantages 
predominantly occur in institutionally less developed countries where political connections compensate 
for weak public institutions (Claessens et al. 2008; Li et al. 2008). Prior evidence from the U.S. suggests 
that in this country rent-seeking from personal connections to politicians is impeded by strong 
institutions (Fisman et al. 2012). Our evidence identifies a different channel through which the proximity 
to political power created by firms’ home states’ political alignment has a detrimental effect on their 
reporting quality: it affects managers’ reporting incentives via its effect on policy risk—even in an 
institutionally strong environment like the U.S.  
The findings of this study suggest that political geography plays a role in explaining financial 
reporting outcomes also within a single country representing a homogenous institutional environment 
for accounting. It contributes to an emerging literature on the effects of politics on financial reporting 
by identifying a setting in which changes in the corporate political environment are exogenous. Future 
research could investigate whether other measures of political geography, e.g., politicians’ hometown 
bias (Faccio and Parsley 2009), lead to similar conclusions with respect to financial reporting decisions 
at the firm level. The potential relation between the cost of capital effects of political alignment 
documented in Kim et al. (2012) and the financial reporting effects analyzed here constitutes a further 
avenue for future research.  
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Appendix A: Main variable definitions (in alphabetical order) 
Variable Definition 
ABSDA 
Absolute value of discretionary accruals (DA). DA are obtained following Dechow 
et al. (1995). Specifically, we estimate the following model for each industry (we 
use the Fama-French 48 industry classification)-year group, excluding industry-year 
groups with less than 20 observations: TA = β1 (
1
ASSETS
) + β2∆REV + β3PPE + 𝜀. 
Then we obtain an estimate of normal accruals (NA) as: NA = β1̂ (
1
ASSETS
) +
β2̂(∆REV − ∆AR) + β3̂PPE. Discretionary accruals are calculated as DA = TA – 
NA. TA is total accruals, calculated as: change in current assets (Compustat ACT) 
minus change in cash and short-term investments (Compustat CHE) minus change 
in current liabilities (Compustat LCT) plus change in debt included in current 
liabilities (Compustat DLC) plus depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat 
DP). ∆REV is change in revenues (Compustat REVT); ∆AR is change in accounts 
receivables (Compustat RECT); PPE is gross property, plant and equipment 
(Compustat PPEGT). All variables are scaled by beginning of year total assets 
(ASSETS, obtained as Compustat AT). 
BM 
Book to market ratio, calculated as book value of equity (Compustat CEQ) divided 
by the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year. Market value of equity is 
obtained as the number of common shares outstanding (Compustat CSHO) times 
the stock price at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat PRCC_F). 
CFO 
CFO is used as proxy for operating profitability and stands for cash flows from 
operations. It is calculated indirectly as income before extraordinary items 
(Compustat IB) minus total accruals. Total accruals is calculated as: change in 
current assets (Compustat ACT) minus change in cash and short-term investments 
(Compustat CHE) minus change in current liabilities (Compustat LCT) plus change 
in debt included in current liabilities (Compustat DLC) plus depreciation and 
amortization expense (Compustat DP). 
IPFG 
Berry et al.’s (1998) citizen ideology index multiplied with a dummy variable that 
becomes one for time periods with a Democrat President. 
IPSG 
The absolute value of the difference between Berry et al.’s (1998) revised 1960-
2013 citizen ideology series and the ADA/COPE measure of state government 
ideology (also from Berry et al., 1998) multiplied with negative one. 
LEV 
Leverage, calculated as the ratio between total liabilities (Compustat LT) and total 
assets (Compustat AT). 
LNOC 
Natural logarithm of operating cycle. Operating cycle is calculated as the sum of 
days accounts receivable and days inventory. Days accounts receivable are 
calculated as 365 multiplied by the ratio between accounts receivable (Compustat 
RECT) and sales (Compustat SALE). Days inventory are calculated as 365 
multiplied by the ratio between inventory (Compustat INVT) and cost of goods sold 
(Compustat COGS). 
LNSIZE 
Natural logarithm of market value of equity. Market value of equity is calculated as 
the number of common shares outstanding (Compustat CSHO) times the stock price 
at the end of the fiscal year (Compustat PRCC_F). 
PAI 
PAI =
1
4
∙ SENATORS +  
1
4
∙ REPRESENTATIVES +
1
4
∙ GOVERNOR +
1
4
∙ (
1
2
∙ STATE SENATORS +
1
2
∙ STATE REPRESENTATIVES) 
where SENATORS is the percentage of the two senators that belong to the 
President’s party. REPRESENTATIVES is the percentage of House representatives 
that belong to the President’s party. GOVERNOR is a dummy that equals one if the 
Governor is in the same party as the President, and zero otherwise. STATE 
SENATORS is a dummy that equals one if the percent of state senators in the 
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President’s party is greater than 50%, and zero otherwise. STATE 
REPRESENTATIVES is a dummy that equals one if the percent of state House 
representatives in the President’s party is greater than 50%, and zero otherwise. 
POL_ACT 
POL_ACT is a dichotomous variable that becomes one if firms actively pursue 
corporate political strategies. Corporate political actions that we observe are 
lobbying and PAC contributions. Both of these data items are available from the 
CRP and have been collected by Bradley et al. (2015). POL_ACT becomes one if a 
company engaged in lobbying or made PAC contributions and if we are able to 
observe both lobbying and PAC contributions. As the lobbying data are only 
available from 1998 to 2008, the analyses using POL_ACT are limited to this time 
period as well. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1%-level. 
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Sample selection procedure for our main sample 
 
 
firm-years 
excluded 
firm-years 
remaining 
firms 
remaining 
Data initially available in Compustat / 439,156 34,848 
– remaining duplicate firm-years 87 439,069 34,848 
– remaining firm-years with SIC code starting with 6 89,751 349,318 26,751 
– remaining firm-years with PAI missing 187,557 161,761 14,634 
– remaining firm-years with our discretionary accruals 
measure missing 16,153 145,608 13,627 
– remaining firm-years with our control variables 
missing (i.e., LNSIZE, BM, LEV and LNOC) 25,485 120,123 11,038 
= Main sample  120,123 11,038 
    
    
BM is the book value of equity over the market value of equity. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural 
logarithm of the operating cycle. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. PAI is our measure of proximity 
to political power; PAI is missing if the geographic location of the firm at the end of the fiscal year cannot be identified using 
Compustat and Compact Disclosure (see Section 4.1). POL_ACT is our proxy for active corporate political strategies. SIC is 
the abbreviation for the Standard Industrial Classification code. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. 
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Table 2 
Variable distributions 
 
   Obs.   Mean   Std. Dev.   p(0.05)   p(0.25)   Median   p(0.75)   p(0.95) 
                 
ABSDA  120,123  0.1117  0.1729  0.0044  0.0234  0.0568  0.1237  0.3981 
BM  120,123  0.7926  0.7115  0.0828  0.3336  0.6079  1.0433  2.2163 
CFO  120,123  0.0257  0.2244  -0.3529  -0.0084  0.0690  0.1295  0.2522 
IPSG  120,123  -14.9215  10.3448  -35.2560  -22.5179  -12.4101  -6.4211  -1.6862 
LEV  120,123  1.3787  2.3535  0.1157  0.4703  0.9692  1.7581  4.4986 
LNOC  120,123  4.8429  0.6842  3.5937  4.4801  4.9087  5.2808  5.8295 
LNSIZE  120,123  4.4174  2.1430  1.1569  2.8069  4.2460  5.9038  8.2084 
PAI  120,123  0.4617  0.2316  0.0938  0.2917  0.4671  0.6394  0.8750 
POL_ACT  29,646  0.1598  0.3664  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  1.0000 
ABSDA  120,123  0.1117  0.1729  0.0044  0.0234  0.0568  0.1237  0.3981 
                                  
ABSDA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals which we estimated using the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995). BM is the book value of equity over the market value 
of equity. CFO is used as our proxy for operating profitability and calculated as income before extraordinary items minus total accruals. IPFG is our measure of ideological proximity to the federal 
government. IPSG is our measure of ideological proximity to the state government. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle. LNSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity. PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. POL_ACT is our proxy for active corporate political strategies. SIC is the abbreviation for the Standard 
Industrial Classification code. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. 
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Table 3 
Pearson and Spearman correlations 
 
  ABSDA BM CFO IPFG IPSG LEV LNOC LNSIZE PAI POL_ACT 
           
ABSDA 1 -0.1107* -0.0860* -0.0144 0.0052 -0.0970* 0.0768* -0.1239* 0.0023 -0.0768* 
BM -0.1406* 1 -0.0717* 0.0198* -0.0358* 0.1008* 0.0029 -0.3735* -0.0009 -0.0860* 
CFO -0.2965* 0.0966* 1 -0.0392* 0.0047 0.0179 -0.2455* 0.3312* 0.0598* 0.1034* 
IPFG 0.0200* -0.0736* -0.0457* 1 0.0887* 0.0067 0.0815* -0.0940* 0.0631* -0.0791* 
IPSG -0.0512* 0.0599* 0.0183* -0.0761* 1 -0.0377* 0.0176 0.0041 -0.0168 0.0166 
LEV -0.0131* 0.0517* -0.0033 -0.0081 -0.0149* 1 -0.2378* 0.1401* 0.0537* 0.1654* 
LNOC 0.0769* -0.0076 -0.2450* -0.0017 0.0557* -0.0883* 1 -0.1349* -0.0493* -0.0898* 
LNSIZE -0.0495* -0.3788* 0.1943* 0.0765* -0.1299* -0.0111* -0.1210* 1 0.0346* 0.3983* 
PAI 0.0087 -0.0075 0.0119* 0.2382* -0.0316* -0.0033 -0.0185* 0.0278* 1 0.0078 
POL_ACT -0.0428* -0.0858* 0.0901* -0.0805* 0.0157 0.0707* -0.0700* 0.4147* 0.0074 1 
                    
* indicates Bonferroni-adjusted significance levels of 0.05 or less. 
Under the diagonal of the correlation matrix (which is highlighted for better visibility) pairwise Pearson correlations are depicted, above the diagonal Spearman correlations are to be found. 
ABSDA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals which we estimated using the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995). BM is the book value of equity over the market value 
of equity. CFO is used as our proxy for operating profitability and calculated as income before extraordinary items minus total accruals. IPFG is our measure of ideological proximity to the federal 
government. IPSG is our measure of ideological proximity to the state government. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle. LNSIZE is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of equity. PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. POL_ACT is our proxy for active corporate political strategies. SIC is the abbreviation for the Standard 
Industrial Classification code. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. 
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Table 4 
Association between proximity to political power and earnings management 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
 All upwards EM downwards EM 
PAI 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.012*** 
 [4.21] [2.80] [3.73] 
LNSIZE -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 [-34.32] [-24.27] [-31.06] 
BM -0.031*** -0.036*** -0.026*** 
 [-31.33] [-25.32] [-23.19] 
LEV 0.001** 0.001** 0.000 
 [2.28] [2.45] [1.29] 
LNOC 0.014*** 0.041*** -0.018*** 
 [9.91] [21.11] [-10.73] 
Obs. 120,123 60,183 59,940 
Adj. R² 0.142 0.164 0.158 
 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In all regressions presented in this table, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. To estimate 
discretionary accruals, we use the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995). All regression models are estimated 
with industry-, year- and state-fixed effects and with standard errors that are clustered by firm. The regression F-test (untabulated) 
is significant at the 1% level in all the models. 
In regressions (2) and (3), we estimate the regression model established in regression (1) separately for firms with positive and 
negative discretionary accruals. Here, ‘upwards EM’ stands for the analyses on firms having positive discretionary accruals, while 
‘downwards EM’ stands for the analyses on firms having negative discretionary accruals. 
PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book 
value of equity over the market value of equity. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating 
cycle. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. 
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Table 5 
Association between measures of ideological proximity to political power and earnings management 
 
 
(1) 
IPFG 
(2) 
IPSG 
IDEOLOGICAL 0.002** 0.001** 
PROXIMITY [2.24] [2.04] 
   
LNSIZE -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 [-34.29] [-34.27] 
BM -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 [-31.28] [-31.29] 
LEV 0.001** 0.001** 
 [2.27] [2.29] 
LNOC 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 [9.90] [9.89] 
Const. 0.060 0.061 
 [1.42] [1.45] 
Obs. 120,123 120,123 
Adj. R² 0.142 0.142 
 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In all regressions presented in this table, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. To estimate 
discretionary accruals, we use the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995). All regression models are estimated 
with industry-, year- and state-fixed effects and with standard errors that are clustered by firm. The regression F-test (untabulated) 
is significant at the 1% level in all the models. 
Our main independent variables in the above analyses are: (1) IPFG, i.e., our measure of ideological proximity to the federal 
government; (2) IPSG, i.e., our measure of ideological proximity to the state government. The coefficients on IPFS and IPSG have 
been multiplied by 10.  
LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book value of equity over the market value of equity. 
LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle. More detailed variable descriptions are 
listed in Appendix A. 
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Table 6 
Results on the substitutional effects of earnings management and corporate political strategies to hedge 
against proximity to political power 
 
 
matched sample 
(propensity score matching) 
 unmatched sample 
(Heckman procedure) 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  
  POL_ACT = 1 POL_ACT = 0  POL_ACT = 1 POL_ACT = 0  
PAI 0.001 0.040**  0.000 0.030***  
 [0.08] [2.27]  [0.00] [4.58]  
LNSIZE -0.010*** -0.007***  0.029*** -0.007***  
 [-4.29] [-2.74]  [3.64] [-4.09]  
BM -0.018** -0.009  0.010 -0.021***  
 [-2.40] [-1.05]  [1.10] [-6.97]  
LEV 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001  
 [0.87] [0.77]  [1.34] [1.50]  
LNOC -0.002 -0.008  -0.001 0.003  
 [-0.25] [-1.07]  [-0.10] [1.04]  
Obs. 4,586 4,586  4,737 24,909  
Adj. R² 0.181 0.177  0.184 0.144   
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In all regressions presented in this table, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. To estimate 
discretionary accruals, we use the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995). All regression models are estimated 
with industry-, year- and state-fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by firm. In regressions (1) and (2), we compare firms 
with active political strategies (POL_ACT = 1) to all firms that did not have political action committees or engage in lobbying 
(POL_ACT = 0). To make sure that our inferences are not driven by the group of firms that did not engage in political actions 
having much more observations than the group of firms engaging in political actions and to correct for a possible selection bias, 
we use propensity score matching in regressions (1) and (2). It is conducted on a one-to-one basis by estimating the effect of 
LNSIZE, BM and INDPOLACT (the proportion of firms, in the same industry and fiscal year, which are politically active) on 
POL_ACT in a probit regression (similar to Bradley et al., 2015). To correct for a possible selection bias in a different way, we 
report the results of the second stage of the estimation of the Heckman (1979) model in columns (3) and (4). In the first stage, we 
use LNSIZE, BM and INDPOLACT again as variables for our selection equation to explain POL_ACT. In presenting these results, 
the coefficient on the inverse Mills Ratios is omitted. The regression F-test (untabulated) is significant at the 1% level in all the 
models. 
POL_ACT is our proxy for active corporate political strategies. It is a coded as a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 if 
a firm has a political action committee, engages in lobbying, or does both, and 0 otherwise. To determine if a company actively 
carries out political strategies, we only considered those firm-years where we had both data on political action committees and 
lobbying. 
PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book 
value of equity over the market value of equity. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating 
cycle. MOMENTUM is the change in end of year stock prices from one year to the next one. More detailed variable descriptions 
are listed in Appendix A. 
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Table 7 
Association between proximity to political power and earnings management  
with additional control variables and for profit and loss firms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Profit Loss all Profit Loss 
PAI 0.009*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.017** 
 [3.50] [2.80] [3.87] [2.87] [2.24] 
LNSIZE -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.007*** -0.005*** -0.007*** 
 [-27.92] [-12.72] [-14.68] [-10.80] [-6.36] 
BM -0.030*** -0.032*** -0.011*** -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 [-27.54] [-19.74] [-6.93] [-4.27] [-5.01] 
LEV 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 0.000 
 [3.42] [-0.71] [2.60] [-0.01] [1.19] 
LNOC 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.005*** -0.005** 0.004 
 [8.53] [5.11] [2.83] [-2.30] [1.17] 
(CFO)   0.085*** 0.175*** 0.058*** 
   [12.20] [13.83] [7.07] 
(SALES)   0.027*** 0.010** 0.024*** 
   [9.90] [2.57] [5.97] 
NEG_EARN   -0.003*** 0.005*** -0.001 
   [-3.30] [3.89] [-0.72] 
CAP_INT   0.015*** 0.037*** 0.002 
   [2.71] [6.07] [0.19] 
INT_INT   -0.730*** -0.097 -0.430*** 
   [-11.96] [-0.38] [-6.65] 
ZERO_INT   0.006*** 0.005** 0.008** 
   [3.19] [2.34] [2.07] 
ALTZ   -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
   [-5.43] [-4.82] [-5.02] 
TAXEXP   0.149*** 0.261*** 0.016 
   [5.39] [6.78] [0.26] 
TQ   0.011*** 0.017*** 0.010*** 
   [9.98] [10.84] [6.40] 
CFO   -0.135*** -0.280*** -0.108*** 
   [-17.31] [-21.96] [-10.31] 
BIG5   -0.004** -0.005** -0.002 
   [-2.53] [-2.54] [-0.59] 
ATI   0.001 0.000 0.001 
   [1.21] [0.22] [0.33] 
Obs. 91,246 28,877 53,474 36,918 16,556 
Adj. R² 0.142 0.103 0.198 0.241 0.152 
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Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In all regressions presented in this table, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. To estimate 
discretionary accruals, we use the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995). All regression models are estimated 
with industry-, year- and state-fixed effects and with standard errors that are clustered by firm. The regression F-test (untabulated) 
is significant at the 1% level in all the models. 
In regressions (1), (2), (4) and (5) we estimate the regression model separately for profit and loss firms. A firm is considered a 
profit (loss) firm if net income before extraordinary items (Compustat IB) is non-negative (negative). 
PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book 
value of equity over the market value of equity. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating 
cycle. See Appendix A for more detail on the definition of these variables. 
 
(CFO) is the standard deviation of cash flow from operations (obtained as net income before extraordinary items, Compustat IB, 
minus total accruals, as defined in section 3), scaled by prior year total assets (Compustat AT), from year (𝑡– 3) to year 𝑡. (SALES) 
is the standard deviation of sales (Compustat SALE), scaled by prior year total assets (Compustat AT), from year (𝑡– 3) to year 𝑡. 
NEG_EARN is the frequency of negative earnings, measured as net income before extraordinary items (Compustat IB), from year 
(𝑡– 3) to year 𝑡. CAP_INT is capital intensity, measured as the ratio of net property, plant and equipment (Compustat PPENT) 
divided by total assets (Compustat AT). INT_INT is intangible intensity, measured as the sum of reported R&D expense 
(Compustat XRD) and advertising expense (Compustat XAD) divided by sales (Compustat SALE), with R&D and advertising 
expenses being set to zero if absent. ZERO_INT a dummy variable for absence of intangibles. ALTZ is the Altman’s Z score and 
it is defined in Section 5. TAXEXP is the total tax expense (Compustat TXT), scaled by prior year total assets (Compustat AT). 
TQ is Tobin’s Q, defined in Section 5. CFO is cash flow from operations. BIG5 is a dummy variable for financial statements 
audited by Big 5 audit firms, calculated using data on the audit firm (Compustat AU). ATI is the antitakeover index developed by 
Bebchuk and Cohen (2003).  
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Table 8 
Association between proximity to political power and earnings management aimed at smoothing 
 
  (1) (2) 
  SMR SMQ 
PAI  2.148*** 0.200 
  [3.77] [1.42] 
LNSIZE  1.083*** 0.435*** 
  [15.41] [17.21] 
BM  1.670*** 0.463*** 
  [7.47] [7.32] 
LEV  0.122*** 0.054*** 
  [2.86] [4.09] 
LNOC  -1.154*** 0.184** 
  [-4.93] [2.20] 
Obs.  54,188 78,846 
Adj. R²   0.099 0.063 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In the above regressions (1) and (2), the dependent variables are two smoothing ratios – SMR and SMQ – respectively. They are 
used instead of the absolute value of discretionary accruals as dependent variables to test the association of proximity to political 
power and earnings management aimed at smoothing. Both regressions are estimated with industry-, year- and state-fixed effects 
and with standard errors that are clustered by firm. The regression F-test (untabulated) is significant at the 1% level in all the 
models. 
We calculate earnings management aimed at smoothing using two different ratios – SMR and SMQ. SMR is the standard deviation 
of a firm’s quarterly income before abnormal accruals and extraordinary items (estimated separately for each industry quarter) over 
the standard deviation of its quarterly income before extraordinary items. SMR is based on the smoothing metric used in Pincus & 
Rajgopal (2002). SMQ is the standard deviation of a firm’s quarterly cash flows of operations over the standard deviation of its 
quarterly income before extraordinary items.  
PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book 
value of equity over the market value of equity. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating 
cycle. See Appendix A for more detail on the definition of these variables. 
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Table 9 
Mediating effect of committee chairmanships in the House or the Senate on the association between 
earnings management and proximity to political power 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  CHAIRMEN = 1 CHAIRMEN = 0 all 
PAI 0.032*** 0.007*** 0.008*** 
 [3.71] [2.59] [2.99] 
CHAIRMEN   -0.007 
   [-0.51] 
PAIxCHAIRMEN   0.023*** 
   [3.46] 
LNSIZE -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 [-13.63] [-32.99] [-33.12] 
BM -0.035*** -0.031*** -0.031*** 
 [-14.09] [-29.74] [-30.01] 
LEV 0.001 0.001* 0.000* 
 [1.51] [1.83] [1.77] 
LNOC 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.013*** 
 [3.54] [9.53] [9.70] 
LNSIZExCHAIRMEN   -0.002** 
   [-2.14] 
BMxCHAIRMEN   -0.004* 
   [-1.79] 
LEVxCHAIRMEN   0.001 
   [1.03] 
LNOCxCHAIRMEN   0.001 
   [0.29] 
Obs. 15,743 104,380 120,123 
Adj. R² 0.133 0.144 0.142 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In all regressions presented in this table, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. To estimate 
discretionary accruals, we use the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995). All regression models are estimated 
with industry-, year-, and state-fixed effects and with standard errors that are clustered by firm. The regression F-test (untabulated) 
is significant at the 1% level in all the models. 
CHAIRMEN indicates whether a firm has been exposed to a relevant change in chairmanship on any of the House or Senate 
committees. We deem a change relevant, if a House member or a senator of any firm’s affiliated state gains or loses power on any 
of the House or Senate committee within the last reporting period. CHAIRMEN is a dichotomous variable that becomes 1 if a firm 
is subject to such a relevant change, while it is coded 0 otherwise. It is measured on the state-year level. 
In regression (1), we estimate our model for the subsample of firm-years where firms have been subject to relevant changes in 
chairmanship on any of the House or Senate committees (CHAIRMEN = 1). In regression (2), we present results on the same 
regression model estimated for firm-years with no such changes (CHAIRMEN = 0). In regression (3), we include CHAIRMEN 
and respective interaction terms into the regression model. 
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PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity. BM is the book 
value of equity over the market value of equity. LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating 
cycle. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. 
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Table 10 
Time effects that influence the association between proximity to political power and earnings management 
 
Reg.   Relevant time periods   coeff. on PAI   Obs.   Adj. R² 
coeff. on (PAI x 
TIME_DUMMY) 
(1)  Election years (President, Congress, State)  0.014*** [3.92]  62,854  0.145 0.005 
(2)   Non-election years (President, Congress, State)   0.009** [2.49]   57,269   0.143 [1.14] 
(3)  Election years (President)  0.018*** [3.60]  30,788  0.154 0.010* 
(4)   Non-election years (President)   0.008*** [2.72]   89,335   0.142 [1.79] 
(5)   Post-midterm   0.016*** [4.71]   61,346   0.14 0.012** 
(6)   Pre-midterm   0.005 [1.21]   58,777   0.15 [2.45] 
(7)   2 years to 1 year before presidential elections   0.014*** [3.31]   30,558   0.131 
0.004 
[0.84] 
(8)   1 year to 0 years before presidential elections   0.018*** [3.60]   30,788   0.154 
0.010* 
[1.79] 
(9)   0 years to 1 years after presidential elections   0.003 [0.63]   29,314   0.161 
-0.012** 
[-2.14] 
(10)   1 years to 2 years after presidential elections   0.007 [1.31]   29,463   0.152 
-0.004 
[-0.79] 
(11)   within 100 days before presidential election   0.027** [2.08]   5,093   0.164 
0.017 
[1.29] 
(12)   within 100 days after presidential elections   0.006 [0.87]   17,520   0.19 
-0.008 
[-1.13] 
 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
In all regressions and for all regression coefficients presented in this table, the dependent variable is the absolute value of discretionary accruals. To estimate discretionary accruals, 
we use the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow et al. (1995). In the third column, we present the coefficient on PAI of our main regression model (ABSDA = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1PAI +
CONTROLS + FIXED EFFECTS + 𝜀) estimated for the subsamples indicated in the second column; in the fourth and fifth columns we present the corresponding number of 
observations and the adjusted R2. The subsamples are determined using dummy variables (TIME_DUMMY) that classify firms’ fiscal years (based on the end of the fiscal year) into 
specific time periods within the electoral cycle. To test the statistical significance of these coefficient differences, we use an interaction regression (ABSDA = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1PAI +
𝛽2TIME_DUMMY + 𝛽3PAI × TIME_DUMMY + (INTERACTED) CONTROLS + (INTERACTED) FIXED EFFECTS + 𝜀), which is run by using all the 120,123 in our main 
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sample, and report 𝛽3 in the last column. In the interaction regressions presented in the first, second and third row, we use the TIME_DUMMY corresponding to Election years 
(President, Congress, State), Election years (President) and Post-midterm, respectively. In the interaction regressions reported in the remaining rows, we use the TIME_DUMMY 
corresponding to the period indicated in the second column.  All regression models are estimated with industry-, year- and state-fixed effects and with standard errors that are 
clustered by firm. The regression F-test (untabulated) is significant at the 1% level in all the models.
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Table 11 
Results on proximity to political power and volatility of future operating profitability 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 σ(CFOF2) σ(CFOF3) σ(CFOF4) σ(CFOF5) 
PAI 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 
 [2.85] [2.76] [3.23] [2.80] 
LNSIZE -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 [-39.11] [-37.79] [-36.06] [-34.25] 
BM -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 
 [-25.23] [-23.46] [-21.16] [-19.22] 
LEV -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 [-4.69] [-6.29] [-6.05] [-5.73] 
LNOC 0.002* 0.002** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 [1.67] [2.30] [2.95] [3.15] 
CFO -0.106*** -0.125*** -0.132*** -0.136*** 
 [-27.11] [-29.95] [-30.09] [-28.65] 
DA -0.061*** -0.078*** -0.088*** -0.095*** 
 [-11.38] [-14.35] [-16.25] [-16.65] 
NDA -0.036*** -0.049*** -0.055*** -0.060*** 
 [-6.17] [-8.47] [-9.16] [-9.59] 
Constant 0.104*** 0.105*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 
 [8.77] [9.21] [9.37] [9.21] 
Obs. 96,943 87,412 78,939 71,344 
Adj. R² 0.152 0.225 0.265 0.292 
Robust t-statistics in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
In all regressions presented in this table, a variable the captures future operating profitability is used. σ(CFOF2), e.g., stands for 
the standard deviation of future operating profitability, with the future two years of operating cash flows (CFOs) being used in the 
standard deviation calculation. Note that CFO is used as our proxy for operating profitability in these analyses. It is calculated as 
income before extraordinary items (Compustat IB) minus total accruals, as defined in Section 3. 
PAI is our measure of proximity to political power. BM is the book value of equity over the market value of equity. DA stands for 
discretionary accruals which we estimated using the modified Jones model introduced by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995). 
LEV is total liabilities over equity. LNOC is the natural logarithm of the operating cycle. LNSIZE is the natural logarithm of the 
market value of equity. NDA stands for non-discretionary accruals. More detailed variable descriptions are listed in Appendix A. 
All regression models are estimated with industry-, year- and state-fixed effects and with standard errors that are clustered by firm. 
The regression F-test (untabulated) is significant at the 1% level in all the models. 
